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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
From 2009 to 2015, Chad Schiermeier was the sole manager of Blaine County
D.A.R.E./P.A.L., Inc. (“DARE/PAL”), a nonprofit corporation formed in 1994 with donated
funds from the Blaine County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”). The BSCO created DARE/PAL to
reach out to in-need children in the community, build positive relationships with law
enforcement, and educate about the dangers of drug and alcohol use. As the DARE/PAL
manager, Mr. Schiermeier could exercise similar authority as a director of the corporation. He
could disburse funds, compensate for projects, and execute any other measures deemed proper to
promote the objects of DARE/PAL. It was undisputed that Mr. Schiermeier successfully ran the
DARE/PAL program for many years. However, following an investigation, the State charged
Mr. Schiermeier with one count of grand theft for stealing money from DARE/PAL. A jury
found him guilty. The district court subsequently sentenced him to fourteen years, with six years
fixed.
Mr. Schiermeier now appeals. He argues the State did not prove the elements of grand
theft beyond a reasonable doubt and, as such, this Court should remand this case with
instructions for the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal. He also argues the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In October 2016, the State filed an Indictment charging Mr. Schiermeier with six counts
of misuse of public funds. (R., pp.31–34.) About five months later, in March 2017, the State filed
a superseding Information charging Mr. Schiermeier with one count of grand theft. (R., pp.139,
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140–41.) Mr. Schiermeier waived a preliminary hearing and a reading of the Information.
(R., p.139.) The charged offense read in full:
That the Defendant, CHAD R. SCHIERMEIER, on or about January, 2009, up to
and including December, 2015, in the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did
wrongfully take, and/or obtain, and/or withhold, and/or exercise unauthorized
control over, lawful money of the United States, with an aggregate value in excess
of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), from the owner, Blaine County
D.A.R.E/P.A.L., INC., with the intent to deprive another of property, and/or to
appropriate to himself certain property of another, and/or to appropriate to a third
person certain property of another, to-wit: through a common scheme or plan did
unlawfully, and without authority, withdraw monies from US Bank account
number XXXX-8338 by cash, and/or check withdrawals, and/or the use of a
financial transaction card, Visa debit card number XXXX-7161 and/or XXXX1876, from an account exclusively for the use of the Blaine County
D.A.R.E./P.A.L., INC., to purchase merchandise and/or withdraw money for his
personal use where the aggregate amounts of the separate incidents exceed one
thousand dollars ($1000.00), in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-2403(1), 182407(1)(b)(1), 18-2408(2)(a) GRAND THEFT, a FELONY.
(R., pp.140–41.) Mr. Schiermeier pled not guilty and exercised his right to a jury trial.
(R., p.139.)
In late August, early September 2017, the district court held a seven-day jury trial. (See
generally Tr. Vol. I,1 p.1, L.1–P.842, L.15; Tr. Vol. II, p.843, L.1–p.1425, L.17.) After the State
rested, Mr. Schiermeier moved for a judgment of acquittal. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.1070, L.3–p.1090,
L.4.) The district court denied his motion. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1090, L.5–p.1096, L.8.) The jury found
Mr. Schiermeier guilty of one count of grand theft. (R., p.443; Tr. Vol. II, p.1423, L.15–p.1424,
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There are four transcripts in the record on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains jury
trial days 1–4 (August 23, 24, 25, and 29, 2017). The second, cited as Volume II contains jury
trial days 5–7 (August 30 and 31, 2017, and September 1, 2017) and the sentencing hearing, held
on November 7, 2018. The third, cited as Volume III, contains a status hearing, held on
March 21, 2017, a pretrial conference, held on August 1, 2017, a motion to withdraw hearing,
held on October 3, 2017, and a motion for bail pending appeal hearing, held on December 5,
2017. The fourth, cited as Volume IV, contains a pretrial conference, held on April 18, 2017, a
motion to continue hearing, held on April 24, 2017, and a restitution hearing, held on January 2,
2018.
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L.4.) After trial, Mr. Schiermeier again moved for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a
new trial. (R., pp.458–81, 486–90.) Mr. Schiermeier then withdrew the motion as untimely filed.
(R., pp.507–08.) The same day, Mr. Schiermeier moved to dismiss the criminal action pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rule 48(a)(2). (R., pp.509–33.) The State objected. (R., pp.540–50.)
Before sentencing, Mr. Schiermeier filed a sentencing memorandum requesting
probation. (R., pp.595–600.) The district court held a sentencing hearing in November 2017.
(R., pp.605–06.) At the start of the hearing, the district court heard argument on
Mr. Schiermeier’s motion to dismiss the criminal action and denied that motion. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.1437, L.10–p.1448, L.23.) The district court proceeded to sentencing. (See generally Tr. Vol.
II, p.1448, L.24–p.1531, L.16.) The State recommended a sentence of fourteen years, with six
years fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1498, Ls.20–24.) Mr. Schiermeier requested the district court place
him on probation or retain jurisdiction (“rider”). (Tr. Vol. II, p.1506, L.24–p.1507, L.25, p.1510,
Ls.17–18, p.1511, Ls.11–13.) The district court agreed with the State’s recommendation and
sentenced Mr. Schiermeier to fourteen years, with six years fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1531, Ls.6–9.)
On November 8, 2017, the district court entered a judgment of conviction, and on
December 14, 2017, Mr. Schiermeier filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.607–09, 631–36.)
After a restitution hearing, the district court ordered Mr. Schiermeier to pay $86,868.03 in
restitution to DARE/PAL. (R., pp.653, 656–59.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the State meet its burden to prove the elements of grand theft beyond a reasonable
doubt?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Schiermeier to fourteen
years, with six years fixed, for one count of grand theft?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The State Did Not Meet Its Burden To Prove The Elements Of Grand Theft Beyond A
Reasonable Doubt
A.

Introduction
Mr. Schiermeier maintains the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove the

essential elements of grand theft beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, he argues the State did
not prove with sufficient evidence that his taking, obtaining, withholding, or control of
DARE/PAL money was wrongful or unauthorized. The State is unable to meet this element of
wrongfulness or lack of authority because the State did not show that Mr. Schiermeier, as the
manager of DARE/PAL, was not using the money in a manner permitted by DARE/PAL’s
articles of incorporation and by-laws. By failing to show a wrongful or unauthorized use of the
DARE/PAL money, the State did not present sufficient evidence to sustain the guilty verdict for
grand theft.

B.

Standard Of Review
“This Court will not overturn a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury
verdict, where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,
285 (2003). “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it
and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven.”
State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 546 (2015). A conviction can be based primarily
upon circumstantial evidence, State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 50–51 (1969), and
“even when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently with a
finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it also
gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt,” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712
(2009).

State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 782, 790 (2017). The Court does not substitute its “judgment for that of
the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable inferences to be
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drawn from the evidence.” State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 546 (2015) (quoting State v.
Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460 (2012)). The Court views “the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution.” Id. (quoting Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 460).

C.

The State Did Not Prove The Elements Of Grand Theft Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Because The State Failed To Show Mr. Schiermeier’s Use Of DARE/PAL Money Was
Wrongful Or Unauthorized
Mr. Schiermeier argues the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s

guilty verdict for grand theft. The State has the burden to prove all elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the
right to due process, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that as a part of that
due process, “no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction
except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of
fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.”
Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 5 (quoting State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 5 (2014)). “[E]ven when it can be
said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” “a properly
instructed jury may occasionally convict.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979).
Appellate review of sufficiency is limited in scope, however. Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 545. The
inquiry is not whether this Court would find the defendant guilty, but whether any rational jury
could have found the State met its burden to prove each essential element with substantial
evidence. Id. at 546. Mr. Schiermeier contends the State did not meet its burden here.
Under Idaho law, “[a] person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to
deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he
wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.” I.C. § 18-2403(1).
A person also commits theft “when he knowingly takes or exercises unauthorized control over,
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or makes an unauthorized transfer of an interest in, the property of another person, with the intent
of depriving the owner thereof.” I.C. § 18-2403(3).
In the case at bar, the State charged Mr. Schiermeier with wrongfully taking, obtaining,
or withholding or exercising unauthorized control over money valued in excess of $1,000 from
DARE/PAL with the intent to deprive or appropriate property of another. (R., pp.140–41.) The
State specifically alleged Mr. Schiermeier, though a common scheme or plan, unlawfully and
without authority withdrew money from the DARE/PAL bank account by cash, check, or debit
card use in order to purchase merchandise or withdraw money for his personal use. (R., pp.140–
41.) The aggregate amounts of the separate incidents exceeded $1,000. (R., pp.140–41.)
Accordingly, the district court instructed the jury:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Grand Theft, the state must prove each
of the following:
1. On or about or between January 2009 and December 2015
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant Chad Schiermeier wrongfully took, obtained or withheld property
or money described as: funds of Blaine County D.A.R.E./P.A.L., Inc.,
4. another person was the owner of the funds
5. with the intent to deprive an owner of the funds or to appropriate the funds, and
6. the funds exceeded one thousand dollars ($1000) in value
OR
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Theft by Unauthorized Control, the state
must prove each of the following:
1. On or about or between January 2009 and December 2015
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant Chad Schiermeier took or obtained or withheld money of Blaine
County D.A.R.E./P.A.L., Inc.,
4. another person was the owner of the funds,
5. the defendant knew that the defendant was not authorized by the owner to do
so, and
6. the defendant had the intent to deprive the owner of such funds.
7. the funds exceeded one thousand ($1000) in value
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If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find
the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
(R., p.430.) The jurors did not have to agree on the form of theft or the amounts, as long as each
juror found a value over $1,000. (R., pp.431–32.) The district court provided standard
instructions on the intent to deprive or appropriate and definitions for theft, person, owner,
property, and obtain. (R., pp.427, 433–37.) Further, the district court instructed the jury that
donations to DARE/PAL became DARE/PAL’s property once they were donated. (R., p.428.)
The district court did not provide a definition of “wrongfully” or “not authorized.” (See generally
R., pp.417–37 (final jury instructions).)
The evidence adduced at trial did not prove Mr. Schiermeier’s taking, obtaining,
withholding, or control of DARE/PAL money was wrongful or unauthorized. The evidence
showed, in 1994, the BCSO started the DARE/PAL program to develop community relationships
between law enforcement and children and to reduce drug and alcohol use. (Tr. Vol. I, p.304,
L.2–p.305, L.16; see generally State’s Ex. 1.2) The BCSO created a non-profit corporation for
the program: DARE/PAL. (Tr. Vol. I, p.305, Ls.17–23; see generally State’s Ex. 1.) Article III of
the Articles of Incorporation outlined DARE/PAL’s purpose:
The purpose or purposes for which this nonprofit corporation is organized are the
transaction of any and all lawful business for which corporations may be
incorporated under the Idaho Nonprofit Corporation Act. This organization is
organized exclusively for charitable and educational purposes within the meaning
of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The specific and primary
charitable purposes for which this nonprofit corporation is formed are to act as a
coordinating, educational, fundraising and service organization to foster, promote,
encourage and increase the knowledge, and understanding of alcohol and drug
addictions or related problems. This nonprofit corporation shall essentially direct
its services and functions toward the people of the State of Idaho, but may extend
its services and opportunities to all who otherwise qualify.
2

Citations to the State’s exhibits refer to the exhibit number, and any citation to a specific page
refer to the pagination of the 548-page electronic document containing these exhibits.
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(State’s Ex. 1, p.1.) Article IX further provided: “A manager is authorized to exercise some or
all of the powers which would otherwise be exercised by or under the authority of the Board of
Directors, as more fully set forth in the By-laws of this nonprofit corporation.” (State’s Ex. 1,
p.3.) The by-laws, in turn, outlined the directors’ authority and duties:
Duties. All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of and
the affairs of the nonprofit corporation managed under the direction of the Board
of Directors, except the Manager is authorized to exercise corporate powers, as set
forth in the Articles of Incorporation, and these By-laws. The board of directors
may:
....
f) audit bills and disburse funds of the corporation;
g) employ agents;
h) determine what, if any, compensation shall be paid to a director of a project;
and
i) devise and carry into execution such other measures as it deems proper and
expedient to promote the objects of the nonprofit corporation and to best protect
the interests and welfare of its members.
(State’s Ex. 2, p.10.) One of the DARE/PAL directors had to be associated with a Blaine County
law enforcement agency. (State’s Ex. 2, p.9.) The board of directors could also elect officers,
such as president, secretary, and treasurer, and the officers had to be members or directors.
(State’s Ex. 2, pp.13–16.) The officers could not be compensated, but the by-laws did not
prohibit compensation for the board of directors or manager. (See State’s Ex. 2, p.16.) The
by-laws also outlined the manager’s authority:
The Board of Directors may appoint a Member3 to be a Manager, who is
authorized to exercise some or all of the powers which would otherwise be

3

Under the articles of incorporation, DARE/PAL could have members: “The number and
qualification of members, the different classes of membership, and the voting and other rights of
9

exercised by the Board of Directors. To the extent so authorized, such Manager
shall have the duties and responsibilities of the Directors, and the Directors shall
be relieved to that extent from such duties and responsibilities. The Board of
Directors may remove the Manager at any time, with or without cause, by a
majority vote of the Board of Directors.
(State’s Ex. 2, pp.16–17.) DARE/PAL initially had five directors on the board, including a
deputy officer who ran the program. (State’s Ex. 1, p.3; Tr. Vol. I, p.309, Ls.17–24, p.313,
Ls.12–20.) A director’s term was either two or three years, and an officer’s term was one year.
(State’s Ex. 2, pp.9–10, 13–14.) The State did not present any evidence of any amendments to
DARE/PAL’s by-laws after its adoption. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.469, Ls.5–9.)
The initial source of funding for DARE/PAL came from grants. (Tr. Vol. I, p.307, Ls.18–
21.) In the late 1990s, the BSCO received one million dollars in drug forfeiture money and began
using a portion of that money to fund DARE/PAL. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.326, L.23–p.329, L.21,
p.331, Ls.19–23.) The BCSO hired Mr. Schiermeier in 1999. (Tr. Vol. I, p.326, Ls.7–11, p.439,
Ls.5–25; State’s Ex. 4.) By 2002, Mr. Schiermeier was the only person running DARE/PAL.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.332, L.23–p.333, L.19, p.387, L.25–p.388, L.15, p.533, Ls.1–10.) Most of the
advertised DARE/PAL programming occurred in June, July, and August for children ages nine
to sixteen. (Tr. Vol. I, p.323, L.19–p.324, L.4; State’s Ex. 10, p.54; State’s Ex. 12, p.59; State’s
Ex. 17, p.72; State’s Ex.20, p.81; State’s Ex. 22, p.85; State’s Ex. 23, p.86.) Later on,

each or all classes of members shall be as set forth in the By-laws of this nonprofit corporation.”
(State’s Ex. 1, p.2.) The by-laws provided:
Membership in this nonprofit corporation shall be granted to any individual or
entity who requests to become a member upon approval by the Board of
Directors, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. The maximum
number of members in this nonprofit corporation shall fifteen (15) members. The
corporation, through the Board of Directors, may establish other reasonable rules
and regulations regarding membership, expulsion, and membership fees or dues
as may be deemed necessary or desirable. A member may resign at any time.
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Mr. Schiermeier also worked as a school resource officer (“SRO”) at Wood River Middle School
(“WRMS”) during the school year and occasionally as a patrol officer. (Tr. Vol. I, p.396, Ls.12–
21, p.549, Ls.21–23, p.638, Ls.13–17, p.639, L.17–p.640, L.13.) He received generally good
performance reviews from BSCO, and the DARE/PAL program was considered a success.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.560, Ls.5–9, p.604, L.18–p.605, L.13, p.644, Ls.20–24)
Sometime between 2002 and 2009, after Mr. Schiermeier took over, DARE/PAL stopped
having meetings. (Tr. Vol. I, p.389, L.8–p.390, L.7, p.394, Ls.3–14, p.461, Ls.2–7, p.462, Ls.7–
9, p.462, L.25–p.463, L.5.) The directors and officers “sort of seemed to melt away.” (Tr. Vol. I,
p.462, Ls.11–16.) Starting in 2002, Mr. Schiermeier was the sole manager of DARE/PAL.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.392, L.24–p.393, L.2, p.515, Ls.8–9, p.660, Ls.4–9.) By 2011, Mr. Schiermeier was
also a director.4 (Tr. Vol. I, p.640, Ls.20–22, p.642, Ls.4–12.) According to the DARE/PAL
annual report, Mr. Schiermeier was the secretary for 2002, secretary and treasurer for 2003,
secretary for 2004, president for 2005, director for 2006 to 2010, and secretary for 2011 to 2015.
(State’s Ex. 3, pp.24–37.) From 2009 to 2015 (the years of the alleged offense), Mr. Schiermeier
was the only listed officer on the annual reporting form. (State’s Ex. 3, pp.31–37.) In addition,
Mr. Schiermeier was added to DARE/PAL’s US Bank checking account as an authorized user.
(Def.’s Ex. A, pp.1–4; State’s Ex. 31, pp.143–44; See Tr. Vol. I, p.806, L.5–p.807, L.24.)
In 2013, the BSCO’s drug forfeiture money started to run low, and DARE/PAL began to
be funded by other donations. (Tr. Vol. I, p.541, Ls.23–25, p.543, Ls.4–11, p.548, Ls.2–16.) In
2015, one group of donors asked how its money was spent, and that request eventually led to an

(State’s Ex. 2, p.6.)
4
At trial, the State did not dispute that Mr. Schiermeier was the sole director or manager of
DARE/PAL at the time of the alleged offenses. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.261, Ls.5–8, p.269, Ls.13–15
(prosecutor’s opening statement); Tr. Vol. II, p.1327, Ls.16–24, p.1328, Ls.15–16, p.1342,
Ls.11–18, p.1347, Ls.10–11 (prosecutor’s closing argument).)
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Idaho State Police investigation of Mr. Schiermeier’s use of DARE/PAL funds. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.548, Ls.17–25, p.558, Ls.2–32, p.562, L.13–p.563, L.9; see generally Tr. Vol. II, p.670, L.21–
p.691, L.1,) Through a financial investigation and forensic accounting expert, the State presented
evidence of Mr. Schiermeier’s alleged theft of DARE/PAL money in two ways: purchases with
the US Bank debit card and cash withdrawals. (See generally Tr. Vol. I, p.827, L.14–p.841, L.11;
Tr. Vol. II, p.862, L.17–p.910, L.23; see State’s Ex. 40.5) The State identified over fifty
purchases with the debit card that it believed were unlawful. (See State’s Ex. 40, pp.47–67.)
Similarly, the State speculated that any cash withdrawals from September to May were unlawful.
(See State’s Ex. 40, pp.40–46, 57–67.) The State did not deem any cash withdrawals during June,
July, and August to be unlawful. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1408, Ls.4–5, Tr. Vol. II, p.908, Ls.12–19, p.909,
L.1–p.910, L.23.) In fact, the State conceded in closing argument:
We acknowledge during the summer months the cash that was withdrawn may
have been spent on DARE/PAL activities, may not have, can’t prove it. It’s not
for you to consider it in determining beyond a reasonable doubt. It’s just cash that
was withdrawn. I don’t know how it was spent and neither do you.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.1350, Ls.11–17, p.1407, Ls.4–5.) In total, the State alleged Mr. Schiermeier stole,
in purchases and withdrawals, $18,192.24 in 2009, $18,416.56 in 2010, $20,780.68 in 2011,
$10,476.07 in 2012, $11,498.95 in 2013, $3,580.00 in 2014, and $3,923.53 in 2015, for a total of
$86,868.03. (State’s Ex. 40, p.68.)
In light of this evidence, Mr. Schiermeier maintains the State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that his use of DARE/PAL money was wrongful or without authority—an
essential element of the offense. The State had two alternative theories for the means of the
commission of grand theft: a wrongful taking, obtaining, or withholding of DARE/PAL money
or an exercise of unauthorized control of DARE/PAL money. (R., pp.140–41, 430.) But, as the
5

State’s Exhibit 40 is contained in a separate PowerPoint file in the record.
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sole manager of the corporation, Mr. Schiermeier had discretion to determine how to use
DARE/PAL funds to further its interests. (See State’s Ex. 1, p.3; State’s Ex. 2, pp.10, 16–17.)
The State did not present any evidence that Mr. Schiermeier’s use of the money was not for
DARE/PAL purposes or objectives.
Turning first to the purchases with the DARE/PAL debit card, the State presented no
evidence that Mr. Schiermeier, as the manager of the corporation, did not purchase items to
further the corporation’s interests. For example, the State showed Mr. Schiermeier purchased
expensive, high-end outdoor equipment and clothing, among other items, with the DARE/PAL
debit card. (See State’s Exs. 501–15; Tr. Vol. I, p.835, L.25–p.836, L.8.) The State also showed
Mr. Schiermeier had some of these items in his possession and used some of that gear during
non-DARE/PAL activities. (See State’s Exs. 518(a)–51; Tr. Vol. II, p.948, L.23–p.1039, L.23,
p.1045, L.16–p.1053, L.4.) That being said, the State did not show Mr. Schiermeier exclusively
used these items for non-DARE/PAL purposes. For example, Mr. Schiermeier could have also
used the items for hikes, camping, archery, or other outdoor activities with the children in the
program. As the manager, Mr. Schiermeier could determine those items were necessary for
DARE/PAL purposes, and nothing in the DARE/PAL articles of incorporation or by-laws
prohibited him from using those items for personal use as well. (See State’s Ex. 1, p.3; State’s
Ex. 2, pp.10, 16–17.) Although former DARE/PAL directors, officers, or members may have
disagreed with Mr. Schiermeier’s purchases and questioned whether they were in the
corporation’s best interests, Mr. Schiermeier, as the sole actor on the corporation’s behalf, had
complete authority to make those decisions. Put another way, Mr. Schiermeier did not
wrongfully or without authority use DARE/PAL money to purchase items. The DARE/PAL
articles of incorporation and by-laws allowed him to use the money, and he could use it for any
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purpose he deemed fit to further the corporate objectives. If Mr. Schiermeier believed certain
items allowed him to better serve those purposes, he was completely permitted to make those
purchases. Thus, the State did not present any evidence that Mr. Schiermeier’s purchases were
not within his discretion at the manager of DARE/PAL.
Turning next to the cash withdrawals, the State’s evidence similarly fails to show
wrongfulness or lack of authority. The State did not show Mr. Schiermeier used the cash for nonDARE/PAL purposes. The State offered no evidence of the cash’s use, whether summer or
winter or any year of the alleged theft. The State also conceded it could not prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the cash withdrawals during the summer months were not for DARE/PAL
purposes because there was no evidence on how DARE/PAL or Mr. Schiermeier used the
money. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1350, Ls.11–17, p.1407, Ls.4–5.) The winter cash withdrawals, however,
contained the same deficiency. During the winter months, Mr. Schiermeier could have used the
cash to reserve tickets for events, buy equipment, or purchase non-perishable food items for
future programs. But, regardless of the cash’s use (during any month), the State did not show that
Mr. Schiermeier’s taking, obtaining, or withholding of that money was wrongful or without
authority. Mr. Schiermeier was authorized to take out money, dispense it, compensate himself or
others (as a project manager), and do anything else necessary for the corporation. (See State’s
Ex. 1, p.3; State’s Ex. 2, pp.10, 16–17.) The State failed to present any evidence that
Mr. Schiermeier, as the manager, did not use the cash for a legitimate purpose. Rather, the State
relied on an arbitrary distinction that any withdrawals during the winter months were not for
DARE/PAL. That is not sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. Therefore, the State did not
present any evidence that Mr. Schiermeier’s cash withdrawals were not within his discretion at
the sole manager.
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In summary, while Mr. Schiermeier acknowledges that the BSCO, donors, and the jury
may now second-guess his use of DARE/PAL funds, he did not wrongfully or without authority
take, obtain, withhold, or control DARE/PAL money, based on the evidence adduced at trial.
The funds belonged to DARE/PAL, and Mr. Schiermeier was the only individual with authority
to exercise DARE/PAL’s objectives. Whether his use of the money was extravagant, the articles
of incorporation and by-laws gave him discretion to use the funds as he deemed proper and
expedient to promote the objects of DARE/PAL. (State’s Ex. 2, p.10.) In light of this discretion
and authority, the State did not present sufficient evidence that Mr. Schiermeier’s use of
DARE/PAL money was wrongful and without authority. Having failed to meet this essential
element beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court should vacate Mr. Schiermeier’s judgment of
conviction and remand this case with instructions for the district court to enter a judgment of
acquittal.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Schiermeier To Fourteen Years,
With Six Years Fixed, For One Count Of Grand Theft
A.

Introduction
Mr. Schiermeier maintains the district court failed to exercise reason and thus abused its

discretion when it sentenced him to fourteen years, with six years fixed, for grand theft. He
argues proper consideration of the mitigating circumstances in this case warranted a more lenient
sentence.

B.

Standard Of Review
When considering whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
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and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8 (2016). Factual findings, including whether a certain factor is a
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, will be upheld if supported by substantial and competent
evidence. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 788–89 (1997).

C.

The District Court Did Not Reach Its Sentencing Decision By An Exercise Of Reason
Because It Failed To Give Sufficient Weight To The Mitigating Factors
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has

the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Id. Similarly, “[t]he choice of probation, among available
sentencing alternatives, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .” State v.
Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1990). Here, Mr. Schiermeier’s sentence does not
exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-2408(2) (fourteen year maximum). Accordingly, to
show the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Schiermeier “must show that the sentence, in
light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v.
Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
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Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
In this case, Mr. Schiermeier argues the district court failed to exercise reason and thus
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts.
Specifically, he contends the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of
imprisonment, a rider, or probation in light of the mitigating factors, including the lack of any
criminal history, absence of any substance abuse or mental health issues, acceptance of
responsibility and remorse, and strong support network.
First, the fact that Mr. Schiermeier has no prior convictions or arrests stands strongly in
favor of a lesser sentence or probation. “The absence of a criminal record is a mitigating factor
that courts consider.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 836 (2011). “It has long been recognized
that ‘[t]he first offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.”
State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982)). Here, Mr. Schiermeier has no prior criminal convictions or
arrests. (PSI, pp.4–5.) His criminal record consists just of two traffic infractions at ages sixteen
and twenty-one. (PSI, p.5.) This instant case is his first felony offense. (PSI, p.5.) Moreover,
while released pending trial, Mr. Schiermeier complied with all court conditions. (See R., pp.53,
88–89, 90–92, 446.) Considering Mr. Schiermeier had no past convictions, charges, arrests, or
compliance issues pending trial, the district court should have imposed a more lenient sentence
for his first criminal offense.
Second, the district court failed to give adequate weight to multiple mitigating factors that
establish Mr. Schiermeier should have received a lesser term of imprisonment, a rider, or
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probation. For example, Mr. Schiermeier does not have any friends that had recently been
involved in criminal activity. (PSI, p.6.) He rarely consumes alcohol. (PSI, p.10.) Similarly,
Mr. Schiermeier has never used any illegal substances. (PSI, p.10.) He also does not have any
mental health issues. (PSI, p.10.) Until the instant offense, Mr. Schiermeier was employed for
over fifteen years with the BSCO. (PSI, p.9; R., p.597.) He worked primarily as the SRO for
WRMS. (R., p.597.) In his free time, Mr. Schiermeier engages in healthy, constructive activities,
such as spending time in the outdoors and with his family. (PSI, p.6.) Moreover, Mr. Schiermeier
remains close with his parents, who live in Twin Falls, and they are supportive of him. (PSI, p.6.)
If placed on probation, he plans to live in Twin Falls and work for his father’s business.
(R., p.596.) Mr. Schiermeier is close with his brother as well. (PSI, p.6.) Mr. Schiermeier’s
children are the most important aspect of his life. Mr. Schiermeier and his ex-wife have three
children together, ages eighteen, thirteen, and eight. (PSI, pp.7–8.) His children are very
important to him, and he is very close with them. (PSI, pp.8, 11.) In fact, Mr. Schiermeier’s exwife wrote a letter explaining the likely impact of Mr. Schiermeier’s incarceration on their three
children. She stated in part:
They admire, respect, and love their father despite his many shortcomings,
mistakes, and current situation. They need and desire his presence in their lives
and his absence creates an emotional turmoil for them that is indescribable. The
very idea that he will not be present for the special moments of their lives, missed
holidays, graduations, and possibly missing out on their weddings weighs heavily
on their hearts. It is my sincere hope that you will take them, their lives, and the
magnitude of this decision’s impact on their futures into consideration in your
final preceding [sic] of this case.
(Addendum to PSI, p.3.) Mr. Schiermeier was assessed with a LSI-R score of 10 and, as such, a
low risk of recidivism. (PSI, pp.11–12.) These mitigating factors—Mr. Schiermeier’s drug-free
lifestyle, stable mental health, employment history, positive interests and activities, strong family
values, support network, and low risk to reoffend—strongly supported a more lenient sentence.
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By imposing a sentence of fourteen years, with six years fixed, Mr. Schiermeier asserts the
district court did not give sufficient weight to these mitigators and therefore failed to exercise
reason at sentencing.
Next, Mr. Schiermeier’s difficult experience in custody prior to sentencing also
warranted a more lenient sentence. As recognized by the district court, Mr. Schiermeier did not
look well at sentencing: “And I’ll just note for the record and I’ll probably say it in pronouncing
sentence, he doesn’t look particularly good, frankly. The record can reflect that. He doesn’t look
the same in the picture in the PSI or him sitting here today in court. It’s not good.” (Tr. Vol. II,
p.1506, Ls.14–18.) While in custody after trial but before sentencing, Mr. Schiermeier lost at
least thirty pounds and developed gout. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1506, Ls.12–13, 19; R., p.598.) He was in
isolation for the first forty days of custody due to his work as a law enforcement officer.
(Tr. Vol, II, p.1506, Ls.1–6, 10–11; R., p.598.) Mr. Schiermeier contends his health problems
and isolation in custody stand in favor of mitigation.
Further, Mr. Schiermeier’s acceptance of responsibility and remorse warrant a lesser
sentence. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in favor of mitigation.
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). As argued by his attorney at sentencing,
Mr. Schiermeier’s interview with the presentence investigator occurred on September 8, 2017,
just seven days after the jury’s verdict. (R., p.443; PSI, p.4; Tr. Vol. II, p.677, Ls.4–5.)
Mr. Schiermeier was upset with the verdict at the time of the interview. (Tr. Vol. II, p.677, Ls.5–
6.) But now, his attorney argued, having spent approximately seventy days in custody,
Mr. Schiermeier realized “that he screwed up” and was ready to accept responsibility for his
actions. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1500, Ls.18–24.) To this end, Mr. Schiermeier stated at sentencing, “I
realize that the choices I’ve made and actions provoked on my part has led to my demise and the
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severe consequences I now face at this time in sentencing.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.1511, Ls.18–20.) He
also apologized to the community affected by his criminal conduct:
I want to apologize for the stress I put on my fellow citizens of the Wood River
Valley who have stood by on good faith and good conscience and were deceived
by my ways of conducting business. I know that the trust and the faith these
citizens once had may not have been completely destroyed but certainly crippled
by my behaviors and my business endeavors. I have ruined their trust, and
whether these citizens were directly or indirectly affected, they are victims of my
actions, and for that I am deeply grieved and I apologize.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.1511, L.25–p.1512, L.9.) He also stated, “I know I have an obligation to mend my
wrongs and plan on doing just that. I place the rest of my life and my freedom and liberties into
your hands and humbly ask for probation and pledge to not let any of you down here or
anywhere else.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.689, Ls.17–21.) These statements establish Mr. Schiermeier
accepted responsibility for his actions and felt remorse. Mr. Schiermeier maintains the district
court did not give sufficiently consider this mitigating factor.
Lastly, and significantly, the numerous letters and testimony in support of
Mr. Schiermeier and his good character demonstrate, despite the aggravating factors, the district
court should have imposed a more lenient sentence. See Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594–95 (family
support and good character as mitigation); see State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 663–64 (Ct. App.
2010) (district court considered family and friend support as mitigating circumstance). Twentyfive letters in support were submitted with the PSI. The letters stated in summary:
•

A family friend of eleven years wrote that Mr. Schiermeier was a sincere,
great person, and that the children in the DARE/PAL program looked up to
him as a mentor and friend. (PSI, p.32.)

•

Two family friends of twenty-five years described Mr. Schiermeier as an
honest and trustworthy person. (PSI, p.33.) They also wrote that he “has
always been a great neighbor, excellent father, and hard worker.” (PSI, p.33.)
They supported him “100% and would like to be able to see him raise his
children to be as good and kind of a person as we know [him] to be.” (PSI,
p.33.)

20

•

Two family friends since 1964 wrote that Mr. Schiermeier and his family
were “upstanding people who were kind and thoughtful and honest.” (PSI,
p.34.)

•

A friend of over twenty-five years, Mr. Williams, described Mr. Schiermeier
as “an upright and honest type of guy” who “always displayed integrity and
impeccable character.” (PSI, p.35.) Mr. Williams wrote: “He is very enjoyable
to be around, and is always helpful. We have had many talks about his work
and how much he loved working with kids at school as a DARE ofﬁcer and in
summer programs. He knew all of the kids at school on a ﬁrst-name basis and
he took a great interest in them for many years. They were all part of his life
and he cared a lot for each and every one of them.” (PSI, p.35.) Mr. Williams
also wrote that Mr. Schiermeier was a great father and his children meant
“everything to him.” (PSI, p.35.)

•

Two long-time family friends were “shocked and saddened” by the events, but
believed Mr. Schiermeier was a “good and caring person and a loving father
to his children.” (PSI, p.36.) They described him as “an upstanding citizen and
an asset to the communities where he’s lived and worked.” (PSI, p.36.)

•

Two friends of twenty-five years explained that they knew Mr. Schiermeier as
a child and watched him grow up. (PSI, p.37.) They wrote that he was honest,
respectful, and reliable. (PSI, p.37.) They believed his stressful divorce
contributed to “the thinking errors leading to his decisions and/or actions in
this case.” (PSI, p.37.) They also wrote: “We are conﬁdent that Chad’s core is
a strong, moral one and he has the potential to rectify any perceptions to the
contrary. He is not a ‘hardened criminal’. He is loved and cherished by his
family and children. The crime of which he is convicted was a non-violent,
non-malicious, and as far as we know, his ﬁrst and only offense. Therefore,
we encourage the court to consider alternatives to incarceration such as
ﬁnancial retribution, and intensive court and community supervision. Given
the opportunity, Chad clearly has the capacity to make a difference in his
community by providing presentations or teaching classes about the dangers
of ‘thinking errors’ such as those he may have engaged in when making some
of [the] decision[s] within his job.” (PSI, p.37.)

•

An employer during Mr. Schiermeier’s release pending trial wrote that he was
always punctual, a team player, respected by his co-workers, and a hardworker. (PSI, p.38.)

•

Two long-time family friends stated that Mr. Schiermeier was always helpful
to his peers, children, or the elderly. (PSI, p.39.) They described him as an
attentive father and a family man. (PSI, p.39.)

•

Family friends of forty years explained, “We have watched Chad grow up in a
close knit family who learned the values of honesty, integrity, and high morals
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as a way of life.” (PSI, p.42.) They believed Mr. Schiermeier enjoyed his
work because he loved teaching children about nature and outdoor activites.
(PSI, p.42.) They stated, “Chad is a wonderful family man that wants the best
for his children.” (PSI, p.42.)
•

Another family friend of over forty years, Mr. Woods, asked the district court
to recognize Mr. Schiermeier’s contributions to the community and his family
before he committed the alleged offense. (PSI, p.43.) Mr. Woods described
Mr. Schiermeier as a dedicated family man and committed to his community.
(PSI, p.43.)

•

A friend of thirty-five years, who worked on a basketball camp for
DARE/PAL programming, believed Mr. Schiermeier was “a great person who
cares more about others than himself.” (PSI, p.44.) He described
Mr. Schiermeier as always willing to help others and work hard. (PSI, p.44.)

•

A social worker at WRMS, who worked with Mr. Schiermeier for fourteen
years at the school, found “Chad to be a consistent, steady presence for the
students.” (PSI, p.45.) This co-worker believed Mr. Schiermeier built positive
relationships with the students and organized positive experiences for the
children in the DARE/PAL program. (PSI, p.45.)

•

The head custodian at WRMS worked with Mr. Schiermeier since 1999 and
knew him to be a “decent, hard working, and giving person.” (PSI, p.46.) This
co-worker joined Mr. Schiermeier on some DARE/PAL programs and
believed he was a great role model for the children in the program. (PSI,
p.46.)

•

A teacher at WRMS, who knew Mr. Schiermeier for thirty-four years, wrote
that Mr. Schiermeier often came to the school early. (PSI, p.47.) The teacher
stated that Mr. Schiermeier helped with many field trips. (PSI, p.47.) This
teacher also spoke very highly of Mr. Schiermeier’s DARE/PAL
programming. (PSI, p.47.)

•

A retired teacher and administrator of the Blaine County School District
believed Mr. Schiermeier to be an honest and friendly person and that the
offense was extremely out of character. (PSI, p.48.)

•

A co-worker of ten years at WRMS described Mr. Schiermeier as “careful,
considerate, and dedicated to the well-being of all the students and teachers at
our school.” (PSI, p.49.) The co-worker wrote, “He is well-regarded among all
the staff at the school as a person of high integrity and honesty. We have been
together in several emergency situations, and he has always conducted himself
with common sense and compassion. I hope this letter will give you an idea of
his good character and help him get a second chance to prove this was an
unusual occurrence.” (PSI, p.49.)
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•

Another co-worker at WRMS stated that Mr. Schiermeier often discussed
DARE/PAL programming with him. (PSI, p.50.) The co-worker observed
Mr. Schiermeier engage in activities with the students and believed the
students enjoyed their interactions with him. (PSI, p.50.)

•

Another co-worker of twelve years at WRMS, who saw Mr. Schiermeier run
the DARE/PAL program, described him as a positive role model for
underprivileged children. (PSI, p.51.) This co-worker asked the district court
“to take into consideration all the good Chad has done for the kids in the
Wood River Valley.” (PSI, p.51.)

•

A co-worker of ten years at WRMS stated Mr. Schiermeier “worked tirelessly
to ensure that the [DARE/PAL] program ran effectively and efﬁciently and in
a way that included as many opportunities as possible for the children of
Blaine County to experience things that they wouldn’t normally have the
opportunity to do.” (PSI, p.53.) The co-worker believed that “the number of
children that benefited from being around Chad is simply astounding.” (PSI,
p.52.)

•

A mother described the positive impact Mr. Schiermeier, in his role as an
SRO officer, had on her oldest daughter, who struggled in middle school with
low self-esteem and confidence. (PSI, p.53.) The mother explained that
Mr. Schiermeier helped her daughter with her anxiety and encouraged her to
attend class. (PSI, p.53.)

•

A teacher and coach at WRMS, who worked with Mr. Schiermeier for fifteen
years, spoke very highly of Mr. Schiermeier’s dedication to his students and
the DARE/PAL programming. (PSI, pp.54–55.)

•

A long-time family friend, Ms. Trenkle, described Mr. Schiermeier as a proud,
loving parent, dedicated family man, serious about his responsibilities, always
willing to help others, and a loyal, honest person. (PSI, p.56.) Ms. Trenkle
believed Mr. Schiermeier chose his line of work to protect those around him
and make life better for others. (PSI, p.56.) She asked the district court to
consider Mr. Schiermeier’s good character at sentencing. (PSI, p.56.)

•

Two long-time family friends explained that Mr. Schiermeier was “an
upstanding student” with a kind and outgoing personality. (PSI, p.57.) They
wrote that he was devoted to his three children and always went “above and
beyond” with work. (PSI, p.57.)

•

Another good family friend, who watched Mr. Schiermeier grow up, found it
impossible to believe that Mr. Schiermeier committed the offense due to his
good character, honesty, and integrity. (PSI, p.58.)
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•

One of Mr. Schiermeier’s teachers and a family friend, Mr. Gerrish, wrote:
“Chad was a quiet, conscientious young man who was a pleasure to have in
class. He was a good student with a passion for the out-of-doors. Over
subsequent years, Chad and I have had occasional interactions through
business and common hobbies, and [h]e has always been forthright and
helpful.” (PSI, p.59.) Mr. Gerrish believed “our society is best served when
fathers are present and able to be actively involved in the raising of their
children.” (PSI, p.59.) Mr. Gerrish asked the district court to consider the
impact of Mr. Schiermeier’s incarceration on his children at sentencing. (PSI,
p.59.)

In addition to these letters, seven individuals testified at the sentencing hearing on
Mr. Schiermeier’s behalf:
•

Mr. Homer, who worked in the Blaine County school system and wrote a
letter in support, (PSI, p.48), testified that he believed Mr. Schiermeier “ran a
quality program” because the students respected him. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1454,
Ls.9–20, p.1455, Ls.13–22.) Mr. Homer was unable to reconcile the offense
because he did not believe Mr. Schiermeier “would do anything intentionally
that would place the DARE program in jeopardy or himself as a law
enforcement officer in jeopardy.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.1455, L.23–p.1456, L.3.)

•

Mr. Silvis, who also wrote a letter in support, (PSI, p.52), worked with
Mr. Schiermeier at WRMS for about ten years, and he testified that
Mr. Schiermeier was dedicated to the well-being of the students. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.1457, Ls.6–15, p.1458, Ls.1–3.) As in his letter, Mr. Silvis testified that
Mr. Schiermeier worked hard to run the program and had “a knack for
working with kids and helping these kids experience the outdoors in a safe
and loving environment.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.635, Ls.10–12.) He believed
Mr. Schiermeier “was a wonderful addition to the community through the
opportunities that he had and he did with the kids of this valley.” (Tr. Vol. II,
p.635, Ls.12–15.)

•

Ms. Ward, who wrote a letter describing her daughter’s experience in the
DARE/PAL program, (PSI, p.53), testified that she had three children in the
program. (Tr. Vol. II, p.636, Ls.14–16.) She explained that she “had an
incredible amount of trust” in Mr. Schiermeier and her children “felt
extremely safe with him.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.637, Ls.4–7.) She further testified
that she experienced firsthand “how much they benefited from being with
Chad and the experiences that he was able to give them was extremely
rewarding.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.637, Ls.19–21.)

•

Ms. Cey, a teacher for Blaine County, helped Mr. Schiermeier with some
summer DARE/PAL trips. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1463, Ls.16–22.) Ms. Cey explained
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that she helped with fundraising because she believed in the program.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.1463, L.23–p.1465, L.6.)
•

Mr. Berry, a close family friend, testified to Mr. Schiermeier’s good character
and his observations on the deterioration of Mr. Schiermeier’s health
throughout the case. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.1467, L.3–p.1470, L.21.)

•

Mr. Trenkle, a teacher and coach at WRMS who also wrote a letter in support,
(PSI, pp.54–55), testified that Mr. Schiermeier worked very hard to run the
DARE/PAL program. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1473, Ls.8–15.)

•

Mr. Evans, a pastor in Twin Falls, testified to his relationship with
Mr. Schiermeier since his incarceration. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1476, Ls.6–7, p.1476,
L.16–p.1477, L.8.) Mr. Evans visited with Mr. Schiermeier about twenty
times. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1477, Ls.6–8.) He testified that, over time,
Mr. Schiermeier had a changed attitude since the trial and showed “genuine
remorse and contrition.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.1478, Ls.3–21.)

As shown by these letters and testimony, Mr. Schiermeier’s facilitation of the DARE/PAL
program was invaluable to the Wood River Valley community. Mr. Schiermeier provided
countless in-need children with positive experiences and mentorship. He was also a dedicated
family man and well-respected friend. For many family, friends, and co-workers, the instant
offense was not illustrative of Mr. Schiermeier’s character. Moreover, Mr. Schiermeier
expressed genuine remorse and acceptance of responsibility for his clearly uncharacteristic
actions. The district court, however, did not give adequate weight to these statements of support
and good character. Nor did the district court adequately weigh Mr. Schiermeier’s contribution to
the community though the DARE/PAL program and as an SRO. If these mitigating
circumstances were properly factored into its sentencing decision, the district court should have
imposed a lesser sentence than the one recommended by the State of fourteen years, with six
years fixed.
In summary, Mr. Schiermeier’s strong support from family, friends, and co-workers,
along with the other mitigating factors discussed above, support a lesser sentence, a rider, or
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probation. The district court did not reach its sentencing decision by an exercise of reason and
therefore abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence for Mr. Schiermeier’s first
criminal offense.6
CONCLUSION
Mr. Schiermeier respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court’s judgment of
conviction and remand this case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of
acquittal. In the alternative, he respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate or vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 20th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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6

In making this sentencing argument, Mr. Schiermeier in no way intends to concede or waive his
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
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